



The Threat Environment for Canadian Ferry Operations

16 Sept 19 – Canadian Ferry Association
Saint John, New Brunswick




Government of Canada

The Caretaker Convention

- During the Election period certain restrictions are placed on Public Servants
- These restrictions apply to:
 1. Sharing of information
 2. Soliciting feedback
 3. Addressing changes to TC policy/regulations
- This presentation will be given in accordance with the Caretaker Convention

Transport Canada



Security Intelligence Assessment Branch (SIAB)

- Transport Canada's point of contact within the intelligence community
- Multi-modal: marine, aviation, surface

Marine Security Operations Centres (MSOCs)

- Marine Domain Awareness
- Threat assessments



Transport Canada

Marine Security Operations – Headquarters

- Protect and preserve Canada's marine transportation system
- Oversee implementation of marine security policies and regulations

Marine Safety and Security Legislative Regulatory & International Affairs – Headquarters

- Develops and implements policies and regulations to promote the security of the marine transportation system

Marine Transportation Security Clearance Program – Headquarters

- Focuses on reducing the risk of security threat by screening out workers who may unlawfully interfere with the marine transportation system

Marine Safety and Security – Regions

- Conducts security oversight and monitoring activities

Background

- Canadian ferries and terminals are an important part of our marine transportation system
 - Contribute to our economic prosperity
 - Provide essential services to Canadians
- Transport Canada – through the *Marine Transportation Security Act* and supporting regulations
 - Work with ferry and terminal operators to promote a secure ferry transportation system


Security Intelligence Considerations

Threat Components:

- ***Intent***: the motivation to develop and carry out a plan or attack.
 - ***Capability***: the ability to accomplish a mission, function, or objective.
- Terrorism
 - Criminal Activity
 - Irregular Migration
 - Illegal Domestic Activism
 - Cyber Systems


Source: Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre (ITAC)

Potential Threats to Ferry Services Terrorism

Propaganda	Attacks	Exploitation
<p>17th issue of the al-Qaida published Inspire magazine</p>  <p>Source: SITE Intelligence Group (U//FOUO)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none">○ Lone actors○ Soft targets○ Unsophisticated	

Potential Threats to Ferry Services Criminal Activity

- Smuggling (of narcotics, counterfeit goods)
 - Cross-country variation in:
 - Likelihood of occurrence
 - Likely perpetrators
 - Vessel types implicated
- Cargo theft




Potential Threats to Ferry Services

Irregular Migration

(For International Ferry Operations)

DESERTERS	ABSCONDERS
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Cleared by CBSA and granted shore leave, but do not return to the vessel prior to departure	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Flee the vessel without permission to disembark;• Covertly leave the vessel (while berthed, or prior to arrival at marine facility)
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• More likely (at ports near major urban centres)	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Less likely



Potential Threats to Ferry Services

Illegal Domestic Activism

- Most activism is peaceful / legal
- Some intent to carry out violent / illegal activity, or activities that would otherwise disrupt operations
- Typically the scale of activism increases during the availability of venues
- Potential to draw persons with possible violent motivations within otherwise legitimate activism



Potential Threats to Ferry Services Cyber Systems

- Types of targets:
 - Corporate IT systems
 - Operational technologies (e.g. SCADA systems)
 - Communications networks
- Marine transportation system is increasingly vulnerable, but may not be explicitly targeted



History of Security Events

Ferry industry specific events

- 16 Jan 1996 - Ferry hijacking Trabzon, Turkey
- 25 Feb 2000 - Ozamiz Ferry bombing, Philippines
- 27 Feb 2004 - SuperFerry 14 bombing Phillipines
- 21 Feb 2018 - Ferry bombing Playa del Carmen Mexico




Other transportation events

- 07 Jul 2005 - Public transportation bombing, London, UK
- 22 Apr 2013 - VIA Rail Plot Arrests, Canada
- 14 Jul 2016 - Truck attack, Nice, France
- 23 Apr 2018 - Vehicle ramming attack, Toronto, Canada



Terrorism Threat Levels (ITAC)



Assessment of Marine Environment

Threat	Target	Assessment
Transnational Terrorism	Commercial Vessels, Ferries & Marine Facilities	Low
Domestic Terrorism	Commercial Vessels, Ferries & Marine Facilities	Medium
Criminal Activity	Marine Facilities	Medium
Irregular Migration Deserters/Absconders	Marine Transportation System (MTS)	Low
Illegal Domestic Activism	Marine Facilities (Overall) <i>Some facilities have different levels</i>	Low

Understanding and Mitigating Threats

- To mitigate security vulnerabilities it is necessary to understand the threats to the marine ferry transportation systems
- Canadian transportation security regulations provide a mechanism to ensure the security of the marine ferry transportation systems – both domestic and international

Canadian Ferry Industry Participation in Marine Security

1. Ensure security plans address all issues identified in your Security Assessment
2. Keep your contact information up-to-date
3. Report **all** marine security incidents no matter how benign

Your Marine Security Inspector is a valuable asset!

Thank you for your attention

Transport Canada

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